12 research outputs found

    Electronic Library Collections and Users with Visual Impairments: Challenges, Developments, and the State of Collections Policies in Academic and Public Libraries

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    Academic and public library collections are developed based on the needs of the communities that surround them. Technology has increased the way users access information, and the way libraries offer information to their users. However, the accessibility of electronic resources for users with print disabilities remains an issue that has yet to have an equitable remedy. This paper identifies the challenges of visually impaired users, the developments in law, the current state of accessibility in academic and public library collections policies, and the current formats and products that are leading the way

    Commitment games with conditional information revelation

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    The conditional commitment abilities of mutually transparent computer agents have been studied in previous work on commitment games and program equilibrium. This literature has shown how these abilities can help resolve Prisoner's Dilemmas and other failures of cooperation in complete information settings. But inefficiencies due to private information have been neglected thus far in this literature, despite the fact that these problems are pervasive and might also be addressed by greater mutual transparency. In this work, we introduce a framework for commitment games with a new kind of conditional commitment device, which agents can use to conditionally reveal private information. We prove a folk theorem for this setting that provides sufficient conditions for ex post efficiency, and thus represents a model of ideal cooperation between agents without a third-party mediator. Connecting our framework with the literature on strategic information revelation, we explore cases where conditional revelation can be used to achieve full cooperation while unconditional revelation cannot. Finally, extending previous work on program equilibrium, we develop an implementation of conditional information revelation. We show that this implementation forms program ϵ\epsilon-Bayesian Nash equilibria corresponding to the Bayesian Nash equilibria of these commitment games.Comment: Accepted at the Games, Agents, and Incentives Workshop at AAMAS 202

    Balancing Adaptability and Non-exploitability in Repeated Games

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    We study the problem of guaranteeing low regret in repeated games against an opponent with unknown membership in one of several classes. We add the constraint that our algorithm is non-exploitable, in that the opponent lacks an incentive to use an algorithm against which we cannot achieve rewards exceeding some "fair" value. Our solution is an expert algorithm (LAFF) that searches within a set of sub-algorithms that are optimal for each opponent class and uses a punishment policy upon detecting evidence of exploitation by the opponent. With benchmarks that depend on the opponent class, we show that LAFF has sublinear regret uniformly over the possible opponents, except exploitative ones, for which we guarantee that the opponent has linear regret. To our knowledge, this work is the first to provide guarantees for both regret and non-exploitability in multi-agent learning.Comment: Accepted at Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 202

    Safety of inhaled glycopyrronium in patients with COPD: a comprehensive analysis of clinical studies and post-marketing data

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    Chronic use of inhaled anticholinergics by patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) has raised long-term safety concerns, particularly cardiovascular. Glycopyrronium is a once-daily anticholinergic with greater receptor selectivity than previously available agents.status: publishe
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